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Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Compensation

Human capital shapes income, inequality, and growth. In the public sphere, human-capital formation depends largely on the selection and retention of teachers. To understand how to improve selection and retention, I use a discrete-choice experiment to estimate teacher preferences for compensation structure, working conditions, and contracts. High-performing teachers have stronger preferences for schools offering performance pay, which implies it promotes positive selection. Under a variety of school objectives, schools appear to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement. The results suggest significant efficiency gains from restructuring compensation: teacher welfare and student achievement can be simultaneously much improved.

Teachers, Labor Markets, Compensation, Salaries, Pay-for-performance, Teacher Selection,Teacher Retention
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EdWorkingPaper suggested citation:

Johnston, Andrew C.. (). Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Compensation. (EdWorkingPaper: 20-202). Retrieved from Annenberg Institute at Brown University:

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